Evidence of Fraud and Conspiracy

G.R. No. 146214             October 5, 2007

RODOLFO M. CUENCA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALBERTO P. ATAS, JULITO F. FABRERO, and HON. NATHANIEL A. LOBIGAS, in their capacity as Hearing Officers of the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION, and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents.

Petitioner has not shown any proof or substantial evidence of fraud and conspiracy. Indeed, he who alleges fraud must prove it for basic is the rule that actori incumbit onus probandi. Differently stated, upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. In the case at bar, the petitioner must therefore establish his allegation of fraud by a preponderance of evidence. Once again, petitioner utterly failed to do this. In addition, it is an aged-old rule in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. Fraud is never presumed, but must be established by clear and convincing evidence.

Procedural Due Process in Administrative Proceedings

G.R. No. 146214             October 5, 2007

RODOLFO M. CUENCA, petitioner, 

vs.

HON. ALBERTO P. ATAS, JULITO F. FABRERO, and HON. NATHANIEL A. LOBIGAS, in their capacity as Hearing Officers of the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION, and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents.

Procedural due process, in gist, is the necessity for notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. Its essence is encapsulated in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike––but hear me first." Thus, as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his/her interests in due course, the party would have no reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process.

In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings where the magistrates or tribunals hearing the case are not bound by the niceties and finer points of judicial due process, the "cardinal primary" requirements of procedural due process, as gleaned by Justice Laurel from an array of American decisions, were enumerated in Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.